The International Laboratory for Logic, Linguistics and Formal Philosophy (LLFP) was founded on April 16, 2018 based on the results of the project competition for creating international laboratories at the Higher School of Economics for the period from April 2018 to December 2020.
LLFP is an interdisciplinary centre of cooperation, where researchers in logic and linguistics come together to apply formal methods to solve conceptual problems, as well as develop integrative approaches, which can address key issues related to classical philosophy, such as truth, knowledge, substantiation, rationality and normativity.
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Abstract
Intuitionistic conditional logic is a branch of modern philosophical logic that solves the problems of formal analysis of conditional expressions of natural language in both indicative ("if A, then B") and counterfactual ("if there were A, then there would be B") forms. The indicative conditional connection in these logical theories is fixed by means of an intuitionistic implication, considered as a designation of an epistemological condition, and a counterfactual conditional connection – by means of two conditional operators, strong and weak, according to D. Lewis, expressing ontic assumptions of the existence of a certain state of affairs described in the antecedent of the counterfactual and not taking place in the actual world, in the so-called nearest possible worlds. G.K. Olkhovikov (2023) proposed the basic propositional intuitionistic conditional logic IntCK, which is a natural conditional analogue of the basic intuitionistic modal logic IK, independently proposed by K. Stirling, G. Plotkin and J. Fischer Servi.The talk is planned to outline the following points:1. To give a brief description of conditional intuitionistic logics.2. Describe their connection with intuitionistic modal logic.3. To define the birelational semantics of G.K. Olkhovikov's IntCK logic and its extensions, which I have defined, variants of D. Lewis's V family logics - IntV, IntVW, IntVC.4. To propose a (complete and correct) formalization by means of the calculus of subordinate natural inference in the style of Fitch-Yaskovsky with the adaptation of the technique of using markers (labels) and relational atoms (relation atoms). The proposed calculus can be easily adapted for conditional logic, the non-modal fragment of which coincides with classical propositional logic, and intuitionistic conditional logical theories in a language with a single conditional bundle, in particular, for the systems described by J. Weiss, I. Ciardelli and S. Liu.
Jointly with the RSUH workshop "Films of thought and possible worlds".
Kruglov A. N. (2024). Teaching logic: A Historical Perspective. Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 8(1), 17-28. https://doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2024-1-17-28 (In Russian)
Dragalina-Chernaya E. G. (2024). Logic As A Formal Philosophy And The Art of A Conceptual Design. Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 8(1), 29-41. https://doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2024-1-29-41 (In Russian)
Bobrova A. S. (2024). Practical Logic: The Return of The Forgotten?. Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 8(1), 42-53. https://doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2024-1-42-53 (In Russian)
Sorina G. V. (2024). Logical And Methodological Foundations of Teaching Humanities. Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 8(1), 54-66. https://doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2024-1-54-66 (In Russian)
Lisanyuk E. N. (2024). Demonstrative Arguments In The logic of Eliminating One Legal Conflict: On The Example Of The Case "Women And the Jury Trial". Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 8(1), 67-80. https://doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2024-1-67-80 (In Russian)
Bazhanov V. A. (2024). Is It Possible To Assert The Existence Of A Correlation Between Politics And Logic? Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 8(1), 81-95. https://doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2024-1-81-95 (In Russian)
Abstract
The talk is aimed to uncover the concept of "analysis" in the philosophy of three classics of "analytical philosophy": G. Ryle, L. Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson.We consider this concept from, perhaps, a somewhat unexpected angle. We are not interested in the doctrine of philosophical analysis itself in the works of these philosophers, but rather in the unpacking of which metaphors it is explained.Thus, the analysis is compared with the construction of a concept map, the compilation of a grammar textbook and psychoanalytic or psychotherapy. The first metaphor belongs primarily to Ryle, the second to Strawson, and the third to Wittgenstein. Although, in one way or another each of the authors addresses all three of them. During our joint presentation we are going show how the unpacking of these metaphors results in three philosophical projects that differ in technique, style and purpose.The report is based on the results of our work in the project group "Philosophy of Metaphors and Metaphors in Philosophy" (https://phc.hse.ru/metaphor /).
Abstract
Jan Lukasiewicz is a well-known Polish logician, considered to be one of the first major researchers in the field of many-valued logic. In this regard, perhaps the most significant work is his article “Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic” wherein he formulates the concept of “possible” as a third truth value. I am going to talk about the logical system that Lukasiewicz is building as well as the motivations that lead him to this concept.
Abstract
Symmetry is the invariance of one when the other is transformed. For example, saving the content when changing the form. Physical theories are full of theoretical symmetries. Due to this, gravitational waves and the Higgs boson were predicted. However, it is still not clear how exactly theoretical symmetries relate to the world around us. I am going to tell you in more detail about the ways physical theories are arranged, what kinds of theoretical symmetries can be found there, what the different ways they relate to the world are and how we can systematize research in this area.
Abstract
Tracing and analysing the responsibility for unsafe outcomes of actors’ decisions in multi-agent settings have been studied in recent years. These studies often focus on deterministic scenarios and assume that the unsafe outcomes for which actors can be held responsible are actually realized. This paper considers a broader notion of responsibility where unsafe outcomes are not necessarily realized, but their probabilities are unacceptably high. We present a logic combining strategic, probabilistic and temporal primitives designed to express concepts such as the risk of an undesirable outcome and being responsible for exceeding a risk threshold in one-shot games. We demonstrate that the proposed logic is (weakly) complete, decidable and has an efficient model-checking procedure. Finally, we define a probabilistic notion of responsibility and study its formal properties in the proposed logic setting.