Elena Dragalina-Chernaya gave a talk at the University of Lisbon.

On May 3, the head of the laboratory gave a talk at the University of Lisbon.

Elena Dragalina-Chernaya gave a talk on "Logical Hylomorphism, Internal Relations, and Analyticity".

Abstract: 

The key concern of this paper is the placing of several approaches to internal relations, analyticity, and logicality in a framework of the distinction between substantial and dynamic models of logical hylomorphism. I’ll start with the historical roots of logical hylomorphism, i.e., the dichotomy of formal and material consequences in “Parisian” and “English” traditions in the fourteenth century logic, and from there I’ll move forwards to its counterparts in the modern logic. The first tradition (e.g., John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen) holds that a consequence is formal if it is invariant under all substitutions for its categorematic terms. According to the second tradition (e.g., Richard Billingham, Robert Fland, Ralph Strode, Richard Lavenham), a formal consequence is valid when the consequent is contained (formally understood) in the antecedent. Thus, the English tradition appeals to the psychologically loaded category of understanding rather than syntactic structures or semantic variations. However, it does not mean that the English Scholastics psychologized formal consequence since the formal understanding grounds formality not only on our power of understanding (intelligibility or imaginability) but also on internal relations. For Scholastics, internal relations are expressed by the eternal truths rooted in potential being. Following Luciano Floridi (2017), I suggest considering, in contrast, Kantian transcendental logic as a logic of design rather than a system of consequences with transcendental limitations grounded on potentiality. Then, I’ll discuss some problems with substantial (model-theoretical) approach to formal relations. Specifically, I’ll address Tarskian permutation invariance criterion for binary quantifiers and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s claim that binary colours (e.g., reddish green) possess formal structures. I’ll try to argue that the interactive dynamic of information processing provides a unified game-theoretical framework for dealing with binary formal relations. Finally, I’ll address the discussion on the analyticity of statements about colour relations. Wittgenstein’s approach to internal relations in his Remarks on Colour is argued for as an attempt of modelling a balance between logic and the empirical.