Ramazan Ayupov's talk ''Frege's Philosophy of Language: On the Way to Pragmatics?''

On September 10, the 99th meeting of the theoretical seminar 'Formal Philosophy' took place.

Abstract

This presentation will examine the debate among Frege scholars concerning the presence of pragmatic elements in his philosophy of language. This discussion arises partly from critiques of Michael Dummett’s [1] interpretation of Frege and from the neo-Gricean debate between Laurence Horn and Christopher Potts regarding conventional implicatures and presuppositions.

Horn [2] argues that Frege anticipated Grice’s account of conventional implicatures. Frege analyzed aspects of meaning that do not affect a statement’s truth value, a concept later formalized as implicature by Grice. Horn highlights Frege’s examination of words like ‘although’, ‘but’, and ‘still’, which add layers of meaning without altering truth conditions. Frege also maintained a strict view of presuppositions (Voraussetzungen), limiting them to proper names, where failure of reference leads to truth-value gaps, making statements neither true nor false.

Thorsten Sander [3], following Horn, explores Frege’s influence on discussions of presuppositions and conventional implicatures. Sander also examines Frege’s concept of ‘side-thoughts’ (Nebengedanken) to explain linguistic phenomena seemingly incompatible with classical predicate logic. He further discusses Frege’s terms ‘colouring’ (Färbung) and ‘illumination’ (Beleuchtung) to describe the semantic contribution of words like ‘but’.

Thus, Horn and Sander affirm the presence of pragmatic elements in Frege’s work, drawing on his treatment of presuppositions, colouring, and illumination. However, scholars such as Stephen Neale, Eva Picardi, and Joan Weiner critique this pragmatic interpretation, advocating instead for a strictly semantic understanding of Frege’s philosophy, in line with Dummett.

The central question I will address is: to what extent are the arguments for the presence of pragmatics in Frege’s philosophy of language justified? On the basis of Grice’s model of pragmatics, I will argue that Frege did not develop a pragmatic theory.

 

[1] Dummett, M. Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

[2] Horn, L. R. Toward a Fregean Pragmatics: Voraussetzung, Nebengedanke, Andeutung. In: E. Kecskes and L. Horn (eds), Explorations in Pragmatics. Berlin: de Gruyter, pages 39-69, 2007.

[3] Sander T. Frege’s Pragmatics. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2025.