Доклад Элиа Дзардини «The Bearers of Logical Consequence»

Elia Zardini

Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy

Complutense University of Madrid

International Laboratory for Logic, Linguistics and Formal Philosophy

School of Philosophy and Cultural Studies

Higher School of Economics

«The Bearers of Logical Consequence» 

Abstract 
What are the primary bearers of the relation of logical consequence? It is first argued against propositions, on the three grounds that propositions do not have enough structure as is required by logical consequence, that it is not at all clear just which propositions should count as standing in the relation of logical consequence and that there are many cases of logical consequence where no propositions are plausibly in the offing. It is then argued against utterances (qua particular speech acts) on the three grounds that utterances seem at the same time too many and too few with respect to the intended field of the relation of logical consequence, that it is not at all clear just which utterances should count as standing in the relation of logical consequence and that some sentences corresponding to logical truths can be uttered falsely. Jointly, these considerations provide enough materials for an argument by elimination to the conclusion that the primary logical-consequence bearers are sentences (qua interpreted syntactic structures), which is then supplemented by two methodological considerations to the effect that it is doubtful that all the results acquired by logic in a sentence-based framework can be translated into other frameworks and that it is undesirable to impute to logicians substantial mistake about the objects constituting the field of the relation they study. Finally, two objections against sentences as primary logical-consequence bearers are addressed, concerning, respectively, the logical evaluation of non-linguistic beings and the fact that some logically valid sentences are not by themselves true.