

**INVARIANCE  
AS A BASIS FOR  
NECESSITY & LAWS**

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# INTRODUCTION

**MANY PHILOSOPHERS FIND NECESSITY BAFFLING.**

**HUMANS, IN PARTICULAR, ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE THOUGHT OF NECESSARY LAWS OF NATURE.**

**THEY VIEW THE IDEA OF SUCH LAWS AS AN ARCANE IDEA OF SECRET, INEXPLICABLE, MYSTERIOUS POWERS GOVERNING THE WORLD.**

**IN THIS TALK I OFFER A DOWN-TO-EARTH YET SYSTEMATIC EXPLANATION OF NECESSITY & LAWS IN TERMS OF INVARIANCE.**

# THE IDEA OF INVARIANCE

INVARIANCE IS AN IMPORTANT AND HIGHLY EXPLANATORY NOTION, widely used in all branches of KN, from Logic to Physics.

IN THIS TALK I REGARD INVARIANCE AS A RELATION:

**X is INVARIANT under Y.**

I FOCUS ON A TYPE OF INVARIANCE THAT IS APPLICABLE IN ALL FIELDS OF KNOWLEDGE.

ROUGHLY:

**PROPERTY X IS INVARIANT UNDER REPLACEMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS, Y.**

# UNDERLYING IDEA

Properties in general are *selective*. They “pay attention” or “are attuned” to *some* features of objects but not to others.

Accordingly, they distinguish between some objects but not others.

For ex:

The property *has-a-mass* distinguishes between *stones* and *numbers* (it applies to the former but not to the latter), but it does not distinguish between *stones* and *stars* (it applies to both).

The same applies to the property *is-subject-to-gravity* or *partakes-in-gravity*.

# Selectivity as INV

This can be expressed in terms of INV:

The property *partakes-in-gravity*  
is INVARIANT UNDER all  
1-1 (and Onto) REPLACEMENTS of  
*stones* by *stars*.

But:

It is NOT INV under any  
1-1 (and Onto) REPLACEMENT of  
*stones* by *numbers*.

## Cont.

Another ways to put this:

If you replace **stones** by **stars**,  
you replace some objects that  
*partake in gravity*  
by other objects that  
*partake in gravity*.

The property *partakes-in-gravity* is not affected.

It **is INV** under these replacements.

## Cont.

But:

If you replace **stones** by **numbers**,  
you replace objects that  
*partake in gravity*  
by objects that  
**don't partake in gravity.**

The property *partakes-in-gravity*  
is **NOT INV** under such replacements.

## **Cont.**

**The selectivity of properties introduces structure – INV Structure – into the world.**

**Some properties are more selective than others – have a HIGHER DEGREE of INV – and different properties are selective in different ways – are INV under different replacements of individuals.**



## Cont.

But to understand the selectivity of properties we have to take into account not just ACTUAL but also COUNTERFACTUAL individuals.

Exs.

1. Co-extensional Properties: *has-a-heart* & *has-a-kidney*.

These properties are INV under the SAME r's of ACTUAL individuals. But NOT under the same r's of COUNTERFACTUAL individuals.

2. Regular Properties: *partakes-in-gravity*.

We don't understand the pattern of selectivity (INV) of *partakes-in-gravity* if we don't realize that if Earth had another Moon, it would *partake in gravity* as much as its actual moon. *Partakes-in-gravity* would not distinguish bet\_ them.

## **Cont.**

**This notion of Counterfactual Individual is NOT a Philosophical Term-of-Art. And it is not associated with any Specific Philosophical Theory of Counterfactuals.**

**It is the EVERYDAY, PRETHEORETIC notion that we use in mundane discourse as well as in all Sciences.**

**(Would Medicine M have been effective, had <this or that> been the case?)**

**It is a common notion, and there is nothing mysterious about it.**

# CLAIMS:

- I. **EVERY PROPERTY IS INVARIANT UNDER SOME 1-1 AND ONTO REPLACEMENTS  $r$  OF INDIVIDUALS.**
- II. **SOME PROPERTIES HAVE A HIGHER DEGREE OF INV THAN OTHERS.**
- III. **THE HIGHER THE DEGREE OF INVARIANCE OF A GIVEN PROPERTY, THE GREATER THE DEGREES OF GENERALITY & NECESSITY OF ITS LAWS/PRINCIPLES.**  
  
I.e.,  $DI(P1) > DI(P2) \rightarrow DN(\text{Principles}(P1)) > DN(\text{Principles}(P2))$
- IV. **THE HIGHER THE DEGREE OF INVARIANCE OF A GIVEN FIELD OF KN, THE GREATER THE DEGREES OF GEN & NEC AVAILABLE TO ITS LAWS/PRINCIPLES.**

# Significance:

**Given that:**

- I. EVERY PROPERTY IS INVARIANT UNDER SOME 1-1 AND ONTO REPLACEMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS,  $r$ ,**
- II. SOME PROPERTIES, Including Some Properties Recognized by Humeans, HAVE A Fairly HIGH DEGREE OF INV,**
- III. There is a Connection Bet\_ HIGH DEGREE OF INVARIANCE, NECESSITY, and LAWS, and**
- IV. None of (I)-(III) are MYSTERIOUS,**

**IT IS NEITHER SURPRISING NOR MYSTERIOUS THAT THERE ARE NECESSARY LAWS OF NATURE (Namely, LAWS GOVERNING/DESCRIBING-THE-BEHAVIOR OF HIGHLY INVARIANT NATURAL PROPERTIES).**

# CLAIM I.

**EVERY PROPERTY IS INVARIANT UNDER SOME 1-1 [& Onto]  
REPLACEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS,  $r$ .**

**Notation:**

**D (Domain): a non-empty set of individuals.**

**$r$  (Replacement Function): any 1-1 function on some D.**

**The claim:  $(\forall P)(\exists r) P$  is INV under  $r$ .**

**This is trivial, since every property is invariant under the IDENTITY  
REPLACEMENTS: functions  $r$  that replace each individual in D by itself.**

**But my claim is stronger:**

**PROPERTIES IN GENERAL ARE INVARIANT UNDER MORE THAN JUST  
IDENTITY  $r$ 's.**

## CLAIM 2:

SOME PROPERTIES HAVE A HIGHER DEGREE OF INV THAN OTHERS:

Some properties  $P1, P2$  are s.t.  $DI(P1) > DI(P2)$ .

Ex.:

$DI(\textit{is-identical-to}) > DI(\textit{partakes-in-gravity})$ .

Intuitively:

*Partakes-in-gravity* is INV under r's of **physical** individuals by **physical** individuals but NOT under replacements of **physical** individuals by **numbers**.

But *is-identical-to* is INV under **both**.

## CLAIM 3:

THE HIGHER THE DEGREE OF INVARIANCE OF A GIVEN PROPERTY,  
THE GREATER THE DEGREES OF GENERALITY & NECESSITY  
OF ITS LAWS/PRINCIPLES.

I.e.,  $DI(P1) > DI(P2) \rightarrow DN(\text{Principles}(P1)) > DN(\text{Principles}(P2))$

We saw that:  $DI(\textit{is-identical-to}) > DI(\textit{partakes-in-gravity})$ .

In fact: *is-identical-to* is INV under all  $r$ 's. It has a Max Degree of INV.

To see that, take any  $r$  and any pair of individuals,  $\langle a, b \rangle$ .

The image of  $\langle a, b \rangle$  under  $r$  is a pair  $\langle c, d \rangle$ .

Because  $r$  is 1-1:  $a=b$  iff  $c=d$ . I.e., *identity* is invariant under  $r$ .

# Cont.

Now, take any Principle Governing *identity*. E.g.,

**(ID) Every individual is identical to itself.**

**Claim:** Since the property *is-identical-to* Does Not Distinguish bet\_ ANY Individuals, the ID principle which governs it cannot Distinguish bet\_ ANY Individuals.

**THIS IS THE KEY POINT:**

**IF A PROPERTY P DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS, ITS PRINCIPLES CANNOT DISTINGUISH BET\_ THEM EITHER,**

**WHERE BY “THE PRINCIPLES OF A PROPERTY P” I MEAN THE PRINCIPLES THAT DESCRIBE ITS BEHAVIOR OVER ALL OBJECTS, ACTUAL & COUNTERFACTUAL, TO WHICH IT APPLIES.**

**→: THE MORE INDIVIDUALS A PROPERTY DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BET\_ , THE GREATER THE SCOPE OF ITS PRINCIPLES.**



## Cont.

I.E., THE **MORE** 1-1 AND ONTO REPLACEMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS A PROPERTY P IS **INV UNDER**, THE **GREATER** THE ACTUAL-COUNTERFACTUAL **SCOPE** OF ITS PRINCIPLES.

Back to the Id property and its principle ID (Every individual is identical to itself):

Let us say that a principle is **GENERAL** if it has a **LARGE ACTUAL scope**,  
And it is **NECESSARY** if it has **both** a **LARGE ACTUAL scope** and a large **COUNTERFACTUAL scope**.

- (1) Since the principles of Id apply to ALL actual individuals, they are **MAX\_ General**.
- (2) Since they apply to ALL counterfactual inds, they are **MAX\_ Necessary**.

## Cont.

**In contrast:** *Partakes-in-gravity* is NOT MAX\_ Invariant.

→ The principles of *gravity* are NOT MAX\_ Gen or MAX\_ Nec.

I.e:  $DN(\text{Principles/Laws of } \textit{identity}) > DN(\text{Principles/Laws of } \textit{gravity})$ .

And similarly for all other Properties and their Laws/Principles.

## CLAIM 4:

THE HIGHER THE DEGREE OF INVARIANCE OF A GIVEN **FIELD of KN (Discipline)**,  
THE GREATER THE DEGREES OF ITS GENERALITY & NECESSITY

I.e.,  $DI(F1) > DI(F2) \rightarrow DN(F1) > DN(F2)$ .

**Explanation:**

Let us associate with each field of KN a characteristic property:

**LOGIC:** *is-an-individual(-simpliciter)*.

**PHYSICS:** *is-a-physical-individual*.

**BIOLOGY:** *is-a-biological-individual*.

And let: **DI(F)** = DI(characteristic property, P, of F),

**DN(F)** = the degree of NEC of the principles/laws of P.

Then: Claim 4 follows from Claim 3.

## Cont.

IT IS EASY TO SEE THAT:

$DI(\text{LOGIC}) > DI(\text{PHYSICS})$ .

Hence:

$DN(\text{LOGIC}) > DN(\text{PHYSICS})$ .

However,  $DI(\text{physics})$  is still FAIRLY HIGH –

physics is INV under ALL r's of physical Individuals by physical Individuals.

Hence:  $DN(\text{physics})$  is FAIRLY HIGH.

## Cont.

Thus, take: *partakes-in-gravity*.

IT IS INVARIANT UNDER THE SAME  $r$ 's AS *is-a-physical-individual*.

I.E.,  $DI(\textit{partakes-in-gravity}) = DI(\textit{is-a-physical-individual})$ .

→ DN(principles of gravity) is **FAIRLY HIGH**.

→ **THE PRINCIPLES OF GRAVITY** – the principles that govern/describe-the-behavior of *gravity* over all individuals, actual and counterfactual, to which it applies – **HAVE A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH DN TO COUNT AS LAWS**.

And there is nothing surprising or mysterious about that.

# Definitions

Let  $r: D1 \rightarrow D2$  be a 1-1 and onto function (bijection).

Let  $P, P1, P2$  be properties.

1. Def of  $INV(P,r)$ :

A.  $P$  is 1-place 1<sup>st</sup>-level:

$INV(P,r)$  iff  $(\forall x \in D1)[P(x) \leftrightarrow P(r(x))]$ .

B.  $P$  is 1-place 2<sup>nd</sup>-level:

$INV(P,r)$  iff  $(\forall P_{D1})[P(P_{D1}) \leftrightarrow P(r^*(P_{D1}))]$ ,

where: (i)  $P_{D1}$  is a 1<sup>st</sup>-level property restricted to  $D1$ .

(ii)  $r^*(P_{D1})$  is the image of  $P_{D1}$  under  $r$ .

2. Def of  $P$  is MAX-INV:  $(\forall r)INV(P,r)$

## Cont.

### 3. Def of $DI(P1) > DI(P2)$ :

**Case 1: At least one of P1, P2 is MAX-INV:**

$DI(P1) > DI(P2)$  **iff**  $\{r: INV(P1,r)\} \supset \{r: INV(P2,r)\}$ .

**Case 2: Neither P1 nor P2 is MAX-INV:**

**Same, but r is restricted to domains with individuals that have at least one of P1, P2 if P1, P2 are 1<sup>st</sup>-level properties**

**( $P_{D1}, P'_{D2}$  such that  $P1(P_{D1}), P2(P'_{D2})$ , if P1, P2 are 2<sup>nd</sup>-level properties).**

# Results for Logic, Math, Science

1. All logical properties are MAX INV. → All logical laws (consequences, truths) have a very high DN.
2. MAX INV captures the idea of FORMALITY in the objectual sense (high-structurality).
3. All higher-level math\_ properties are FORMAL. → All higher-order math\_ laws have a very high DN.
4. Given that ALL 1<sup>st</sup>-order math\_ individuals and properties are correlated with FORMAL properties (1 – ONE, 2 – TWO, ... *is-even* – EVEN, ... ):

1<sup>st</sup>-order math can be viewed as representing FORMAL (higher-level) math.

→ 1<sup>st</sup>-order math derives its strong NECESSITY from that of FORMAL (higher-level) math.



# Results for METAPHYSICS & SCIENCE

1. **Necessity comes in Degrees. → Possibility comes in Degrees – There are larger and smaller “spaces” of possibility.**

2. **This enables us to explain the difference bet\_ Accidental & NEC Generality in Physics. Exs:**

(a) There are no very large (e.g. 1 mile in diameter) spheres of Gold on Earth.

(b) ... .. Uranium on Earth.

Fact: (a) is due to the fact that there is not much gold on Earth.

(b) is due to the fact the structure of Uranium rules out large Uranium spheres.

**Now: Within the space of L\_ possibilities, both are accidental.**

**But within the space of PHYSICAL possibilities,**

**(a) is accidental, (b) is NEC\_:**

**(a) Is physically ACCIDENTAL; (b) is physically NEC\_.**

# Result for MATH & SCIENCE

The view that Math\_ properties are MAX INV (FORMAL) leads to a new answer to Wigner's Question:

## HOW IS MATH APPLICABLE TO PHYSICS?

Our A: FORMAL properties, being MAX INV, don't distinguish bet\_ individuals of any kind.

→ They apply to all individuals, including PHYSICAL individuals.

→ Math\_ laws apply to PHYSICAL individuals..

There is nothing surprising or special about that.

# Result for PHIL & SCIENCE

**We have already seen how INV Th dissolves Humean worries about NEC\_LAWS.**

**(If there is INV in NATURE, there is a GROUNDWORK or INFRASTRUCTURE for NEC\_LAWS in NATURE.)**

**Another WORRY concerning LAWS of NATURE centers on their ABSTRACTNESS.**

**Humeans:**

- **To abstract is to abstract from what is real. To falsify. To ignore what is real.**
- **Abstraction resides in us, not in Nature. Nature includes only particular objects and their particular properties.**

**INV Th: NO.**

## Cont.

**INV Th:**

The real properties of real objects are **SELECTIVE** in character.

They themselves ignore, i.e., abstract from, various features of (differences between) objects.

→ Real Properties are already **ABSTRACT** in NATURE.

Some of these properties are abstract to a considerable degree.

These are the **HIGHLY-INV** Physical Properties (such as *gravity*).

**SINCE INV, HENCE ABSTRACTION, IS BUILT INTO NATURE, NECESSARY LAWS ARE BUILT INTO IT AS WELL.**

# Cont.

## **REALISM:**

**Psillos (2014): The reality of laws is based on the reality of patterns and regularities.**

## **INVARIANCE Th:**

- **MAX INV** is a mark of **FORMAL** patterns.
- **PHYSICAL INV** is a mark of **PHYSICAL** (or **Physical & Math\_**) patterns.

**If, and to the extent that, there are objects and properties in nature, there is a network of INVARIANCES in nature, and these are the basis (one of the bases) for the reality of NATURAL PATTERNS, REGULARITIES, and LAWS.**

# LIMITS of INV Th

It is important to be clear about what INV Th purports to do and what it does not purport to do.

What it purports to do:

Provide a down-to-earth, non-mysterious, yet systematic, basis for the possibility of Nec laws in various fields: Physics, Math, L, etc.

In the case of MAX INV fields, such as L & Math, it actually establishes presence of Nec\_ LAWS in them.

In the case of Non-MAX-INV fields, such as Physics & Biology, it establishes a GROUNDWORK or an INFRASTRUCTURE for NEC\_ laws of various degrees of NEC.

It shows that there is a theoretical basis – a nonmysterious theoretical basis – for the existence of such laws.

## Cont.

What INV Th does not purport to do:

1. INV Th does not purport to rule out additional Phil\_ guidelines for, and even requirements on, laws and laws-supporting properties.  
Exs: Goodman – Projectibility;  
David Lewis – a balance bet\_ naturalness & strength.
2. INV Th does not purport to determine what the laws of nature are or, even, whether there are laws of nature. This is left for scientists to do, partly on pragmatic grounds, but primarily by probing the world.

## Cont.

3. The INV\_ infrastructure of laws of nature is limited to laws that describe the behavior of HIGHLY-INV properties over all objects to which they in principle apply.

It does apply to laws of other kinds, e.g., stipulative and singular laws (e.g., laws concerning the speed of light, unless this is needed for highly-INV\_ laws).

Such laws require either a Non-INV Expl or an extension of the INV\_ Expl.





**THANK YOU!**

# Exs. of INV

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**Case 1:** 1<sup>st</sup>-level Properties.

**Ex:** *is-a-human*.

**Consider:**

$D = \{\text{Obama, Tarski, 1, 2}\}.$

**r** s.t.:

$r(\text{Obama}) = \text{Clinton}$

$r(\text{Tarski}) = \text{Frege}$

$r(1) = 4$

$r(2) = \text{Mt. Everest}.$

**Claim:** The 1<sup>st</sup>-level property *is-a-human* is invariant under **r**.

## Cont.

$r(\text{Obama}) = \text{Clinton}$

$r(\text{Tarski}) = \text{Frege}$

$r(1) = 4$

$r(2) = \text{Mt. Everest.}$

Claim: the 1<sup>st</sup>-level property *is-a-human* is invariant under  $r$ .

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**Why?**

**b/c:**

$r$  replaces each individual which HAS the property *is-a-human* by an individual which also HAS the property *is-a-human*,

&

each individual which DOESN'T HAVE the property *is-a-human* by an individual which DOESN'T HAVE the property *is-a-human*.

## Cont.

*Is-a-human* is NOT invariant under:

**$r'$ :  $r'(\text{Obama}) = 1$  ,  $r'(\text{Tarski}) = 2$  ,  $r'(1) = \text{Tree 1}$  ,  $r'(2) = \text{Tree 2}$ .**

## Cont.

Case 2: **2<sup>nd</sup>-level properties.**

Ex: **IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS**

[This is a property of all 1<sup>st</sup>-level properties that are applicable in principle to some mammals].

Among the 1<sup>st</sup>-level properties that **HAVE** this 2<sup>nd</sup>-level property is the property *is-a-human*.

Among the 1<sup>st</sup>-level properties that **DON'T HAVE** this 2<sup>nd</sup>-level property is the property *is-a-number*.

# Cont.

Case 2: 2<sup>nd</sup>-level properties.

Ex: IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS

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Consider the domain  $D$  as above. I.e.,  $D = \{\text{Obama}, \text{Tarski}, 1, 2\}$ .

Let  $r$  be a 1-1 function on  $D$  where:

$r(\text{Obama}) = \text{Dog 1}$      $r(\text{Tarski}) = \text{Dog 2}$ ,     $r(1) = \text{Tree 1}$ ,     $r(2) = \text{Tree 2}$ .

Claim: IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS IS INVARIANT UNDER  $r$ .

## Cont.

$\mathbf{r}(\text{Obama}) = \text{Dog 1}$     $\mathbf{r}(\text{Tarski}) = \text{Dog 2}$ ,    $\mathbf{r}(1) = \text{Tree 1}$ ,    $\mathbf{r}(2) = \text{Tree 2}$ .

Claim: IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS IS INVARIANT UNDER  $\mathbf{r}$ .

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Why?

$\mathbf{r}$  **INDUCES** a replacement of the 1<sup>st</sup>-level property *is-a-human* by the 1<sup>st</sup>-level property *is-a-dog*.

But the 2<sup>nd</sup>-level property **IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS** does not notice this change.

From the point of view of **IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS** there is no difference between the 1<sup>st</sup>-level properties *is-a-human* and *is-a-dog*.

## Cont.

**IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS** is NOT invariant under

**r'**:

**r'(Obama) = Tree 1, r'(Tarski) = Tree 2, r'(1) = Snake 1, r'(2) = Snake 2.**

**r'** induces a replacement of *is-a-human* by *is-a-tree*.  
and *is-a-tree* is **not** A-PROPERTY-OF-MAMMALS.



# IS-A-NONEMPTY-PROPERTY is INV under ALL $r$ 's.

Take any  $D$  and  $r$  on  $D$ .

Now, take any 1<sup>st</sup>-level 1-place property  $P$ .

2 cases:

1.  $P$  is NONEMPTY in  $D$ .
2.  $P$  is EMPTY in  $D$ .

Now consider the image of  $D$  and  $P$  under  $r$  in both cases.  
Let's call the image of  $D$  under  $r$   $D'$ .

1.  $r(P)$  is NONEMPTY in  $D'$ .
2.  $r(P)$  is EMPTY in  $D'$ .

Result: IS-A-NONEMPTY-PROPERTY is INV under  $r$ .

Since  $D$ ,  $r$ ,  $P$  are arbitrary:

IS-A-NONEMPTY-PROPERTY is INV under ALL  $r$ 's.